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ABSTRACT  
Attackers tend to use complex techniques such as combining multi-step, multi-stage attack with 
anti-forensic tools to make it difficult to find incriminating evidence and reconstruct attack 
scenarios that can stand up to the expected level of evidence admissibility in a court of law. As 
a solution, we propose to integrate the legal aspects of evidence correlation into a Prolog based 
reasoner to address the admissibility requirements by creating most probable attack scenarios 
that satisfy admissibility standards for substantiating evidence. Using a prototype 
implementation, we show how evidence extracted by using forensic tools can be integrated with 
legal reasoning to reconstruct network attack scenarios. Our experiment shows this implemented 
reasoner can provide pre-estimate of admissibility on a digital crime towards an attacked 
network. 
Keywords: forensics, electronic crime, digital evidence, admissibility, network attack scenario, 
evidence graph  
1.   INTRODUCTION 
During trials, judges are often asked to rule 
on the admissibility of electronic evidence. In 
preparation for arguments relating to 
admissibility, digital crime investigators look 
for evidence and arguments about their 
attributes (described shortly) in order to 
convince a judge or a jury at the trial stage 
that the potential attack scenario they 
constructed from the evidence is more 
convincing than the one presented by the 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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defense. According to federal rules on digital 
forensics, five issues must be considered when 
assessing whether given digital evidence will 
be admitted. They are (1) relevance, (2) 
authenticity, (3) not hearsay or admissible 
hearsay, (4) best evidence, and (5) not unduly 
prejudicial. Although some of these issues 
may not directly apply to all instances, a 
prosecution considers all of them and their 
applicability. Otherwise, he/she runs the risk 
of evidence being ruled as insufficient in the 
court, and consequently, the charge would be 
dropped or the accused would be ruled not 
guilty as charged. 
Independent of these legal standards, to 
avoid being traced or leaving incriminating 
evidence, attackers tend to use complex 
techniques such as multi-host, multi-step 
attacks covered up by using anti-forensic 
techniques or tools, which makes finding 
incriminatory evidence and reconstructing an 
attack problematic. In attacks committed 
against digital assets, attack scenarios do 
constitute a substantial part of a prosecution’s 
narrative that needs to be accepted by a jury 
or a judge to get a conviction.  
Although using IDS alerts as forensic 
evidence has been contested, they provide the 
first level of information to forensics analysts 
on creating potential attack scenarios 
(Sommer, 2003). In order to use IDS alerts as 
evidence, many have proposed aggregating 
redundant alerts and correlating them to 
determine multi-step, multi-stage attacks 
(Dain and Cunningham, 2001; Debar and 
Wespi, 2001; Wang and Thomas, 2008). 
While such aggregation can help in 
reconstructing a multi-stage, multi-step attack 
scenario, to the best of our knowledge, none of 
this work has been integrated with legal 
acceptability standards of evidence. In some 
cases, forensic investigators can quantify 
assertions by quantifying the relevance of 
evidence and their credibility with uncertainty 
(Eoghan, 2002). However, in some cases, the 
evidence could be missing or intentionally 
destroyed, which prevents quantifying their 
relevance and credibility. In order to address 
the problem of missing or destroyed evidence 
and assign weights to an attack scenario 
constructed from some evidence over the 
alternatives in supporting or refuting such an 
construction (that is what constitutes a 
prosecution’s story vs. a defense’s alternative 
explanation that exonerates the accused), we 
use an anti-forensics database and 
corresponding hypothesis to help with 
expanding investigations (Liu, Singhal, and 
Wijesekera, 2012 and 2014). Also, substantial 
amount of researchers have proposed using 
Bayesian networks to quantify the relevance 
and credibility of criminal or digital evidence 
for quantifying admissibility judgments. In 
addition, Dempster-Shaffer theory has also 
been used in calibrating digital evidence. We 
found little if any publications that formalized 
legal acceptability and the associated 
quantification method to directly applicable 
software in order to construct multi-step, 
multi-stage attack scenarios for the 
prosecutorial use in a court of law. As a 
preliminary step towards achieving this goal, 
we proposed to use federal rules as guidelines 
to pre-check the admissibility of evidence 
(Liu, Singhal, and Wijesekera, 2014). 
However, in that work, we did not describe a 
specific method to integrate federal rules to a 
Prolog reasoning based system, nor did we 
discuss how to assign quantitative values to 
evidence credibility with aspects of legal 
standards and integrate them to an attack 
scenario. This paper provides that missing 
link by formalizing legal requirements of 
evidence admissibility to our attack scenario 
reconstruction framework, and shows how to 
quantify the forensic investigators’ assertion 
on the attack represented by given evidence. 
The rest of the paper is written as follows. 
Section 2 describes background of the 
addressed problem and related work. Section 
3 describes an experimental network and the 
constructed attack scenario by using Prolog 
reasoning rules. In Section 4, we discuss how 
to formalize the specific predicates and rules 
in a Prolog based system to reflect the 
admissibility of federal rules. In Section 5, we 
describe how to integrate the quantified 
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evidence to our constructed evidence graph 
for admissibility evaluations. Section 6 shows 
the applicability of our method by using an 
experimental network. Lastly, Section 7 has 
our conclusions.  
2.   BACKGROUND AND 
RELATED WORK 
Our framework codifies federal rules on digital 
evidence in a Prolog based tool, which 
constructs an evidence graph visualizing the 
corresponding attack scenarios that happened 
in an attacked network. In order to explain 
our method, this section describes the 
admissibility requirements of digital evidence 
and the definition of an (probabilistic) 
evidence graph.  
2.1 Admissibility/Credibility of Digital 
Evidence 
According to federal rules on digital forensics, 
whenever the admissibility of digital evidence 
is called into question, following rules are 
applied. They are (1) Authenticity (Rules 901 
and 902), (2) Hearsay or not (Rule 801-807), 
(3) Relevance (Rule 401), (4) Prejudice (Rule 
403), (5) Original writing (Rule 1001-1008). 
Among them, the most important rule is 
relevance criteria. Federal rules of evidence do 
not include a formal mathematics or statistics 
standard that evaluates levels of certainty 
associated with digital evidence, because there 
isn’t a universally accepted way to assess the 
credibility or accuracy of digital evidence due 
to many reasons. First, the complexity and 
multiplicity of computer systems and attack 
techniques vary. Second, the level of attack 
certainty (the credibility/weight) that digital 
investigators assign to their findings is 
influenced by their expertise and experience 
(Casey, E.). However, federal rule 104(e) is 
related to credibility or weight, which does 
not limit the right of a party to introduce 
evidence to a jury prior to determining its 
relevance and credibility. Here, the so-called 
weight is described as the measure of credible 
proof on one side of a dispute as compared 
with the credible proof on the other (Balls, 
Amcoff, Bremer, Casati, Coecke, and Clothier, 
2005).  
In order to facilitate the expression of 
opinions regarding the certainty of an 
assertion on the evidence credibility and 
weight, Bayesian network modeling is used to 
calculate the analysts’ judgment on the 
certainty of evidence (Liu, Singhal, and 
Wijesekera, 2012; Keppens, Shen,  and 
Schafer, 2005; Kwan, Chow, Law, and Lai, 
2008). Besides, Weiss 2003 suggests using a 
10-point scale of certainty based on legally 
defined standards of proof and compares 
“legal”, “scientific” and “Bayesian” scales, 
which provides a more precise way to 
characterize a forensics analyst’s judgment. 
The hierarchy of legal standards of proof and 
corresponding Bayesian probabilities consists 
of (from highest to lowest) (1) beyond any 
doubt (100%), (2) beyond a reasonable doubt 
(>99%), (3) clear and convincing evidence 
(90-99%), (4) clear showing (80-90%), (5) 
substantial and credible evidence (67-80%), 
(6) preponderance of the evidence (50-67%), 
(7) clear indication (33-50%), (8) probable 
cause: reasonable grounds for belief (10-33%), 
(9) reasonable, articulable grounds for 
suspicious (1-10%), (10) no reasonable 
grounds for suspicion (<1%), and totally 
impossible (0%). Civil and criminal litigation 
uses different levels of acceptability of 
evidence.  
2.2 (Probabilistic) Evidence Graph 
An evidence graph is a graphical model, which 
presents evidence of intrusions and their 
dependencies that can be used to reconstruct 
multi-stage and multi-step attacks that may 
have been launched against an enterprise 
network.  The formalized definition can be 
found in (Wang, and Thomas, 2008; Liu, 
Singhal, and Wijesekera, 2013). The following 
is the one defined in Liu, Singhal and 
Wijesekera. 
Definition 1 (Evidence Graph): An evidence 
graph is a sextuple G=(Nh, Ne, E, L, Nh-Attr, 
Ne-Attr), where Nh and Ne are two sets of 
disjoint nodes representing a host computer 
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involved in an attack and its related evidence; 
E ⊆(Nh ×Ne) U (Ne×Nh); L is mapping from 
a node to its label; Nh-Attr and Ne-Attr are 
attributes of a host node and an evidence 
node respectively. 
• Attributes of a host node 
a. Host ID: Identity of a host node. 
b. States: Host node category consisting of 
one or many of the “source”, “target”, 
“stepping-stone” and “affiliated”. Affiliated 
hosts have suspicious interactions with an 
attacker, one of victims or stepping-stone 
computers.  
c. Timestamps: Time stamps that record the 
attack states of a machine. System time 
should be synchronized in a distributed 
system. 
• Attributes of an evidence node 
a. General attributes: Includes event initiator, 
event target, event description and event time 
stamp(s). 
b. Relevancy(r): Measurement of evidence 
impact on attack success, which includes the 
irrelevant true positive = 0, unable to verify 
= 0.5 and relevant true positive =1. 
c. Weight (w): A value from [0, 1] that is used 
to represent the impact of evidence on the 
corresponding attack. For example, port-scan 
evidence gets less weight than buffer overflow 
evidence.  
d. Host importance (h): A value from [0,1] 
indicating the bigger importance of two hosts 
connected by an evidence edge.  
Liu, Singhal, and Wijesekera (2013) 
defined a probabilistic evidence graph to 
quantify the overall weight of intrusion 
evidence that represents the attack certainty 
in an attack scenario. Similar work that uses 
Bayesian network modeling can be found in 
Kwan, Chow, Law, and Lai (2008), but the 
definition in Liu, Singhal, and Wijesekera 
(2013) uses the evidence attributes from 
Definition 1, and it calculates p(e) and p(h) as 
follows. 
Definition 2(Probabilistic Evidence Graph): is 
a graph G=(Nh, Ne, E, L, Nh-Attr, Ne-Attr, p) 
where the probability assignment functions 
p[0,1] for an evidence edge “e” and a victim 
host “h” are defined as follows. 
a. p(e)=c(e) × w(e) × r(e) × h(e), where “w”, 
“r” and “h” are weight, relevancy and the 
importance of an evidence edge “e” (Wang, 
W., and Thomas, E.D., 2008). “c” is the 
category of evidence, including primary 
evidence, secondary evidence and hypothesis 
testing based on expert knowledge.  While 
primary evidence is explicit and direct, second 
evidence is implicit and circumstantial.  
Hypothesis is the expert opinion when a 
particular attack is not substantiated by 
physical evidence. 1, 0.8 and 0.5 are suggested 
to assign to the three different evidence 
categories respectively. However, the 
assignment could be different by different 
expert knowledge or the value can be changed 
if the evidence category has been changed. 
For example, the hypothesis value 0.5 will be 
replaced by 1 if solid primary evidence has 
been found. 
b. p(h)= p[(∪eout)∪(∪ein)], where eout are all 
edges whose source computer is host “h” with 
a given attack-related state, and ein are all 
edges whose target computer is “h” with the 
same state. 
2.3 Related Work  
In the area of non-digital forensics, Keppens 
and Zeleznikow (2003) describes how to use 
inductive and abductive reasoning to model 
potential crime scenarios and correlate 
evidence. Keppens, Shen, and Schafer (2005) 
uses Bayesian inference to evaluate how well 
the given criminal evidence is a better fit for 
substantiating one scenario over possible 
alternatives. Both papers are based on 
traditional forensics, and do not apply to 
digital evidence per-se.  
In the area of digital forensics, Wang and 
Thomas describe one schema that use 
reasoning to correlate attack steps 
substantiated by digital evidence, which uses 
aggregated security event alerts by checking if 
they have the same source-destination pair, 
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belong to the same attack class and 
timestamps falling within a self-extending 
time window. A self-extending time window is 
a time window that is updated by elongating 
the window to include the one with a new 
alert but the time difference is within a 
predefined limit T.  
Definition 1 also decorates an item of 
evidence between two hosts with relevance, 
weight and host importance to assess the 
overall weight of the aggregated evidence. 
Based on this extra information, we discussed 
how to compute the attack credibility of the 
attacked host computer substantiated by 
evidence, but did not relate it to the 
quantitative aspects of legal standards. Also, 
in order to quantify the strengths of 
hypotheses that are based on the legal 
admissibility judgment of evidence, Kwan at 
el. proposed using a Bayesian belief network 
to analyze the evidence with respect to 
hypothetical scenarios, and thus, enhancing 
the credibility and traceability of the results 
produced by digital forensic investigations 
(Kwan, Chow, Law and Lai, 2008).  The 
Bayes’ theorem used for evidence analysis in 
Kwan is P(E|H)=P(E)P(H|E)/P(H), where 
P(E|H) is the  conditional probability of 
evidence E based on hypothesis H; P(E) is the 
prior probability of evidence E; P(H|E) is 
posterior probability representing the 
probability that hypothesis H has actually 
occurred when E is detected; and P(H) is the 
prior probability of hypothesis H judged by 
investigators’ background knowledge. In their 
paper, Hwan at el. also demonstrated how to 
use this Bayesian probability assignment 
model by applying the model to a digital 
forensics legal case from Hong Kong Police 
Department, in which the defendant used his 
computer to distribute a pirated movie on the 
Internet by using BitTorrent (Magistrates’ 
Court at Tuen Mun).  
Wang and Thomas (2008) use fuzzy-logic 
based correlation to find the causality 
relationship between different evidence, which 
constructs the attack scenario in a graph 
form. Fuzzy logic does not learn membership 
rules during or after problem solving. Also, it 
uses imprecise values, which makes it difficult 
to use any mathematical model to compute 
precise numbers. In order to solve these 
limitations and integrate an anti-forensics 
database to hypothesize about missing or 
destroyed evidence, we proposed to modify a 
Prolog based attack graph generation tool, 
MulVAL, to reconstruct attack scenarios (Liu, 
Singhal, and Wijesekera, 2014). MulVAL 
adopts Datalog as the modeling language to 
analyze the software vulnerability, 
configuration description, rules and other 
security related facts for constructing and 
reasoning about attack paths. This 
methodology makes it easy to leverage 
existing vulnerability database and scanning 
tools by expressing their output in Datalog 
and feeding it to its reasoning engine. In our 
previous paper, we proposed to integrate 
federal rules of evidence into MulVAL, but 
did not provide a way to formalize the 
admissibility standards or compute the 
credibility of forensics investigators’ assertions 
substantiated by evidence. 
3.  AN EXAMPLE NETWORK 
AND RECONSTRUCTED 
ATTACK SCENARIO 
3.1 Our Experimental Network 
Figure 1 shows the topology of our 
experimental network that is similar to Liu, 
Singhal, and Wijesekera (2014). Table 1 
shows the machine IP address and 
vulnerability information. By exploiting 
vulnerabilities listed in Table 1, we were able 
to successfully launch two kinds of attacks on 
the database server. One was launched by 
using a workstation to get access to the 
database server (CVE-2009-1918), and the 
other was by using the webserver to attack 
the database server (SWE89). Our installed 
intrusion detection system, configured 
webserver and database server were able to 
detect the attacks and log malicious accesses. 
The corresponding aggregated alerts and log 
information used as evidence are shown in 
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Table 2, which were used in the extended 
MulVAL for attack scenario reconstruction. 
We chose the last alert or log item’s time 
stamp in Table 2 as the time stamp of the 
aggregated alert or log from the hyper alerts 
or logs that have the same source-destination 
pair, belong to the same attack class with 
time stamp falling in our pre-defined time 
window. 
3.2 Reconstructing Attack Scenarios 








Figure 1 an Experimental Attacked Network 
Table 1 Machine IP Address and Vulnerability 
Machine IP Address/Port Vulnerability 
Attacker 129.174.124.122  
Workstations 129.174.124.184/185/186 HTML Objects Memory Corruption 
Vulnerability   (CVE-2009-1918) 
Webserver1--Product Web Service 129.174.124.53:8080 SQL Injection (CWE89) 
Webserver2--Portal Web Service 129.174.124.53:80 SQL Injection (CWE89) 
Administrator 129.174.124.137 Cross Site Scripting Flaw (XSS) 
Database server 129.174.124.35  
 
Table 2 Formalized Evidence of the Alerts and Log from the Attacked Experimental Network 
Timestamp Source IP Destination IP Content Vulnerability








08/13-14:37:27 129.174.124.122 129.174.124.53 SQL Injection Attempt CWE89 
08/13-16:19:56 129.174.124.122 129.174.124.137 Cross Site Scripting XSS 
08/13-14:37:29 129.174.124.53 129.174.124.35 name='Alice' AND 
password='alice' or '1'='1' 
CWE89 
… …     
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Figure 2 the Experimental Network Attack Scenario Reconstructed from the Alert/Log
in Liu, Singhal, and Wijesekera (2014), we 
constructed an evidence graph that reflects 
the attacks as shown in Figure 2, where 
Appendix 3 describes the notations of all 
nodes. The graph representation in Figure 2 
differs from Definition 1, where a primitive 
fact node, shown as a box, represents specific 
network configuration or vulnerability 
information of a host that corresponds to a 
unit of evidence. A derivation node, shown as 
an ellipse, representing a successful 
application of an interaction rule on (input) 
facts including primitive facts and prior 
derived facts substantiated by the evidence 
obtained after an attack step. A derived fact 
node is shown as a diamond. There are three 
constructed attack paths in Figure 2: (1) the 
attacker used cross-site scripting attack to get 
administrator’s session ID and therefore to get 
admin privilege (6?4?3?2?1); (2) the 
attacker used a web application that does not 
sanitize users’ input to launch a SQL injection 
attack on the database 
(6?15?14?13?12?10?9); (3) by using 
buffer overflow vulnerability on the IE 
browser, the attacker compromised 
workstations and used them as stepping 
stones to access the database 
(6?24?23?22?21?19?9 and 
6?33?32?31?30?28?9). 
3.3 Rules and Facts Used for Reasoning 
Attack scenario generation uses rules that are 
constructed from generic attack scenarios to 
analyze the collected evidence and check if the 
evidence can be correlated together to 
construct an attack tree in the form of a 
graph. Appendix 1 shows a snippet of generic 
attack generating rules, and Appendix 2 has 
the evidence abstracted in the form of 
predicates as shown in Appendix 1. The 
evidence shown in Appendix 2 are primary 
facts because they correspond to the 
combination of a specific software 
vulnerability, computer configuration, 
network topology, and security policy, which 
have been successfully exploited in the 
experimental network to launch the attacks. 
The meaning of the predicates representing 
the primary facts is as follows: (1) predicate 
“attackedHost” represents the destination 
victim computer; (2) predicate “hacl”, which 
means the host access control list, is used to 
describe network topology; (3) predicate 
“advances” represents the access rights within 
the firewall, which are used by the attacker to 
reach the next computer after the attacker 
has comprised a computer; (4) predicate 
“timeOrder” is used to assure that an attack 
step’s start time and end time falls within a 
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reasonable interval, which would be discussed 
shortly, and (5) all other evidence collected on 
a particular host computer or between the 
source-destination computer pairs are 
formalized as follows: 
 “vulExists(workStation1, 'CVE-2009-1918', httpd).  
  vulProperty('CVE-2009-1918', remoteExploit, 
privEscalation). 
  networkServiceInfo(workStation1 , httpd, tcp , 80 
, apache). ”   
 
4.  PREDICATES AND RULES 
USED FOR EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBILITY 
Admissibility criteria of evidence place 
additional constraints on the data and their 
handling processes, including the chain of 
custody issues. To ensure that collected 
evidence satisfies these constraints, we address 
two issues. First, in a dynamic environment, 
the evidence changes at a high rate, but 
forensic tools keep up at a regular rate. In 
particular, attackers can use anti-forensics 
tools to obfuscate or destroy the evidence. 
Second, an individual tool or evidence 
collection resource may not be able to meet 
all the needs of a particular investigation.  In 
either case, the admissible evidence should be 
validated and substantiated using additional 
constraints including timestamp, relevance, 
and possibly testing for validatable 
hypothesis. Admissibility criteria may render 
the graph in Figure 2 inapplicable, as there 
isn’t proper analysis on each piece of evidence 
that is used to create the graph. In order to 
analyze evidence against admissibility 
constraints, we enhance MulVAL by adding 
rules that help ascertaining the legal 
admissibility standards of evidence, which in 
turn requires adding new predicates.  
4.1 Timestamp 
One of the attributes useful in modeling legal 
admissibility check is to have a timestamp on 
each piece of evidence in order to substantiate 
the chronological order of the attack steps. 
We do so by checking if the start time and 
end time of an attack step represented by the 
corresponding evidence fall in a reasonable 
timeframe. We say reasonable because exact 
timestamp values may not be accurate due to 
system delays in reading clocks and logging 
mechanisms. Consequently, a distributed 
timestamp is needed in a distributed 
enterprise network. Also, attackers may try 
different techniques until the attack is 
successful, possibly having multiple attempts 
to attack the same victim bearing different 
time stamps from different source computers. 
________________________________________ 
1. interaction_rule( 
2.            (evidence(H,Perm) :- 
3.                  execCode(H,Perm), 
4.                  timeOrder(Source,H,T1,T2), 
5.                  hold(T1,T2)), 
6.            rule_desc('evidence with timestamp', 
1.0)). 
7.  hold(T1,T2) :- 
8.        compare(<,T1,T2), 
9.        (T2-T1) @< 0.50. 
/*This timeOrder in input fact will instantiate the 





Figure 3 Predicates and Rules Related to 
Timestamps 
Based on the above reasons, as shown 
between Line 1 to Line 6 in Figure 3, we 
implement a new rule “evidence(H,Perm)” 
that uses two new predicates 
“timeOrder(Source,H,T1,T2)”, “hold(T1,T2)” 
and a derived fact predicate 
“execCode(H,Perm)” that represents the 
attack status after an attack step has been 
executed  to assure that the attack launched 
from a source computer to a  destination 
computer did occur in a reasonable timeframe. 
In this rule, the “interaction_rule” in Line 1 is 
a string that uniquely identifies a rule in 
MulVAL framework, with a description on 
Line 6.  In Line 3, predicate 
“execCode(H,Perm)” says the attacker has 
successfully attacked the destination computer 
“H” with the obtained privilege “Perm”. In 
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Line 4 and Line 5, the two new predicates 
“timeOrder(Source,H,T1,T2)” and “hold(T1, 
T2)” specify the attack timeframe. The four 
variable terms “Source”, “H”, “T1” and “T2” in 
“timeOrder” will be instantiated by constants 
in Line 10 and 11 that are extracted from 
primary facts input file in Appendix 2 (bold 
font), where the four terms with constants 
represent source computer, destination 
computer, timestamp 1, the start time of the 
attack from the “Source”, and timestamp 2, 
the end time of the attack to “H”. 
“hold(T1,T2)” in Line 5 calls the new added 
rule “hold(T1,T2)” between Line 7 to Line 9, 
where Line 8 of the rule body, 
“compare(<,T1,T2)”, is a Prolog built-in 
function that checks the validity of T1<T2,  
and Line 9 uses Prolog built-in functions, 
“@<”(less than), to ascertain the time interval 
of the attack is less than 50 minutes.  
4.2 Computing the Relevance of Evidence 
Relevance is important for evidence 
admissibility. We constructed and used an 
expert knowledge advisory database to check 
the evidence relevance of the corresponding 
attack to minimize false positives. To 
construct the expert knowledge database, we 
downloaded vulnerable machine states in the 
SQL table records as Table 3 from MITRE 
OVAL (http://oval.mitre.org/) and NIST 
NVD (http://nvd.nist.gov/). Columns in 
table 3 include a unified vulnerability name, 
the operating system, software and its 
versions that support a successful attack.  
Based on our expert knowledge database, 
we added  a predicate 
“vulRelevance(Software,Privilege)” to rules in 
the rule file “interaction_rules” (Appendix 1) 
to determine the evidence’s relevance. In this 
new predicate, variable terms “Software” and 
“Privilege” are instantiated by the data in the 
“Software” column and “Privilege” column 
respectively. We use this predicate model if 
the software configuration on the attacked 
computer matches “Software” and “Privilege” 




2.  (execCode(Host, root) :- 
3.      execCode(Host, _Perm2), 
4. vulExists(Host, _, Software, localExploit, 
privEscalation), 
5.      vulRelevance(Software,Privilege)), 
6.   rule_desc('local exploit',1.0)). 
Figure 4 an Example Rule with Predicate 
“vulRelevance”  
An example rule with the added predicate 
“vulRelevance(Software,Privilege)”  is shown 
in Figure 4.  Here, the term “Software” in 
predicate “vulExists”(Line 4) represents the 
name of the software used in the attacked 
computer where the evidence has been 
collected and the term “Software” in predicate 
“vulRelevance”(Line 5) is obtained from the 
bug report community such as OVAL or 
NVD. When the specific “Software” in 
predicate “vulExists” matches the one in 
predicate “vulRelevance”, the relevance 
between the evidence and corresponding 
attack can be established and the value of 1 
will be assigned to it. 
Table 3 Expert Knowledge/Vulnerability Database Obtained from OVAL 
Entry OS Software Privilege Version Attack Action 
CVE-
2009-1918 
Windows IE User IE 5.01 SP4; IE 6 
SP1;IE 6 Win XP 
SP2 
Allows remote attackers to 
execute arbitrary code via a 
crafted HTML document 
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There are two scenarios where the 
instantiated “Software” in the two predicates 
“vulExists” and “vulRelevance” do not match. 
(1) The instantiated “Software” in predicate 
“vulExists” is known not to have the 
vulnerability.  
(2) The instantiated “Software” in predicate 
“vulExists” is different from the one in 
“vulRelevance”, but has not been reported 
to vulnerability advisory database, and 
hence assumed not exploitable to launch 
a successful attack.   
Under condition (1), because relevance is 
0, our reasoning won’t generate any attack 
traces. For condition (2), according to 
Definition 1, we assign 0.5 out of 1 to 
relevance, indicating that we need further 
investigation or may need to simulate the 
attack to make the relevance judgment better.  
4.3 Substantiated Validation vs. Hearsay 
As mentioned in federal rules of evidence, 
except for “admissible hearsay” standard for 
business records that can be admissible in the 
court, declared “hearsay”, such as a verbal 
attack report, cannot be used as evidence. 
However, so-called “hearsay” evidence could 
help an investigator to discover an attack not 
discovered by IDS or logging systems. For 
example, in our experimental network, 
through the cross-site script attack on the 
administrator’s computer, the attacker was 
able to send out phishing update information 
to other clients of the portal web service, 
asking them to update their confidential 
personal information. Because our intrusion 
detection system did not detect the phishing 
attack, a further investigation on the phishing 
attack should be performed to obtain evidence 
that satisfies the required level of 
acceptability standards of admissibility. Here, 
captured and validated network packets could 
substantiate the attack by showing that the 
clients sent confidential information to a 
malicious computer instead of the portal web 
service. Also, the investigator could detect 
that the administrator’s cookie session ID has 
been stolen as further substantiation of this 
phishing attack. 
________________________________________ 
1. interaction rule( 
2.  (execCode(Host, root) :- 
3.         execCode(Host, _Perm2), 
4.  vulExists(Host, _, Software, localExploit, 
privEscalation), 
5.         vulRelevance(Software,Privilege), 
6.        notHearsay(_)),     //will be 
instantiated by the input fact 
7.   rule_desc('local exploit',1.0)). 
 
8. notHearsay(X):- 
9.         \+ hearsay(X).     
Figure 5 Predicate and Rule Used for Judging 
Whether Given Evidence is Hearsay  
The predicate and rule we implemented 
for judging declared hearsay or validated 
evidence are illustrated in Line 6, Line 8 and 
9 in Figure 5, where the predicate 
“notHearsay(_)” in Line 6 calls the rule 
between Line 8 and 9. The rule 
“notHearsay(X)” has a single predicate body, 
which is “\+hearsay(X)” representing the 
evidence is not declared hearsay. Here, “X” is 
the source evidence and “\+” is default 
negation. As mentioned, because the source of 
evidence has two categories (declared hearsay 
and validated evidence resource including 
admissible hearsay, this rule “notHearsay(X)” 
will disqualify the declared hearsay because 
“\+hearsay(X)” returns “false” on declared 
hearsay. If the evidence “X” is substantiated 
by validated evidence, “notHearsay(X)” 
returns “true”, which can be used to combine 
other admissibility criteria, such as relevance 
in Figure 4, to judge the admissibility of 
validated evidence. Figure 5 shows an 
example of the combined “notHearsay” and 
relevance admissibility criteria judgment, in 
which the judgment on relevance (Line 3, 4, 
5) has been introduced in 4.3.  
4.4 Using Dynamic Clauses to Assist 
Choosing Admissible Evidence 
We use the “assert(clause)” and 
“retract(clause)” predicates in Prolog to insert 
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and retract hypothesis as dynamic clauses in 
our desire to have different explanations of 
the same evidence or missing evidence.  
________________________________________ 
1.   hypo_condition(Hyp):- 
2.                  assert(Hyp), 
3.                  postCondition. 
 
4.    postCondition :-  
5.           execCode(H, Perm). 
…. // Actual rule is skipped because of 
limited space 
 
6.   | ?- 
hypo_condition(hacl(internet,webserver,_,_)).    
//assert this access control policy 
7.   yes 
8.   | ?- postCondition.    //postCondition 
holds 
9.   yes 
10. | ?- retract(hacl(internet,webserver,_,_)).  
//retract this control policy 
11. yes 
12. | ?- postCondition.     //postCondition does 
not hold any more 
13. no 
Figure 6 Use “assert/retract” to Assert 
Hypothetical Conditions  
Figure 6 is an example that asserts a 
network access list to check if the 
hypothetical precondition results in the post 
conditions that present the computer status 
after a particular attack. In this example, in 
the rule of “hypo_condition(Hyp)” (Line 1), 
the hypothetical condition is asserted (Line 2) 
to check if  the “postCondition” (Line 3) of the 
hypothetical condition will match current 
computer status represented by 
“execCode(H,Perm)” in Line 5. 
“execCode(H,Perm)” is the body of the rule 
“postCondition” in Line 4, called by the 
predicate “postCondition” in Line 3. With 
asserted dynamic conditions, the forensic 
investigators could test different assumptions, 
and do “what if” analysis in the corresponding 
reconstructed attack scenario to find the best 
explanation for evidence admissibility. Our 
example shows that with the asserted 
hypothesis “hacl(internet, webserver, _, _)” 
that represents that he attacker can access 
webserver from the Internet (Line 6-7), the 
“postCondition” matches the current computer 
status (Line 8-9). Without this access 
condition (Line 10-11), the current computer 
status won’t be matched (Line 12-13), because 
the returned result is “false”, implying that the 
attacker must have used the Internet access 
to attack the webserver. 
5. QUANTIFYING EVIDENCE 
FOR ADMISSIBILITY CHECK 
There are situations where there are different 
explanations on the same evidence or different 
evidence between the same source-destination 
computers, because of the following reasons: 
(1) actions thought benign by IDS could have 
played a role in a coordinated attack; (2) 
attackers have launched different attacks, but 
only one of them succeeded; (3) different 
experts might have different explanations on 
the same evidence. If there is no specific test 
that can be used to determine whether digital 
evidence possesses the requisite scientific 
validity, besides using the asserted dynamic 
clauses to observe the difference as we 
discussed in 4.4, we use Definition 2 to 
calculate the evidence’s credibility 
probabilities under different attack scenario 
explanations so that we can choose one with 
higher value over the alternatives. The Court 
in Daubert suggested, in a case like this, the 
court can inquire the admissibility of the 
evidence judged by the expert’s “principles 
and methodology” that has been tested, 
published or widely accepted (Ryan and 
Shpantzer, 2003).   
MulVAL has assigned a probability 
number to each rule (for example, line 7 in 
Figure 5), indicating the attack success 
probability. However, this number is 
meaningless to the attack scenario constructed 
by evidence, because the collected evidence 
could be quite different in even similar attack 
cases. In order to solve the problem, we use a 
Java program to read “r”,”w”,”h” for each piece 
of evidence and assign the calculated “p(e)= 
c(e) × w(e) × r(e) × h(e)” to the 
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corresponding derivation node(a derivation 
node is an oval node in Figure 2). Here, “w” 
and “h” are assigned by forensics experts, and 
“r” is obtained using the method described in 
Section 4.2. Afterwards, following the 
constructed evidence graph structure, our 
Java program calculates “p(h)=p[(Ueout)U 
(Uein)]” for each derived node(the diamond 
nodes in Figure 2). Our paper has detailed 
discussion on how to calculate the overall 
weight probability, so we will skip the detail 
here.  
Because the nature of litigation (civil vs. 
criminal) places different standards of 
evidence admissibility, different overall weight 
standards could be used to evaluate the 
admissibility/weight of the evidence for 
different cases (Weiss, 2003). Since this has 
specific comparison between the legal 
standards of proof and its corresponding 10-
scale Bayesian probability, we used the work 
in Weiss, C., 2003 and chose the evidence that 
had a probability larger than “(5) substantial 
and credible evidence (67-80%)” as the 
admissibility evidence. As described in our 
own work, this probability is not fixed. More 
evidence on the same attack step could 
increase the weight of the evidence. This has 
been specifically discussed in Liu, Singhal, and 
Wijesekera (2013).   
6.   EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
By adding predicates and rules to the Prolog 
based reasoning model and calculating the 
overall credibility/weight of the evidence and 
corresponding attacked hosts, we would be 
able to use the most admissible evidence 
obtained from a particular attacked network 
to construct a substantiated attack scenario.  
In our experimental network, by using the 
new added predicates, rules and performing 
further investigation on declared hearsay in 
our experimental network, we obtained the 
new evidence graph in Figure 7, where the 
attack path (Node 6->Node 33->Node 32 -> 
Node 31 -> Node 30 -> Node 28 -> Node 9) 
on “Workstation 2” from Figure 2 has been 
removed since the evidence is not admissible 
as discussed before (Firefox in Windows 7 
won’t support a successful attack by using 
“CVE-2009-1918” vulnerability that is based 
on IE browser. Besides, a further investigation 
did not find any successful attack trace). In 
addition, a new attack path that is based on 
the declared “hearsay” of phishing attack has 
been added to the constructed evidence graph, 
because a further investigation proved that 
malicious script had been injected to the 
forum webpage and “phishing URL” was also 
found in the clients’ computers. This new 
added attack path is “node 1 -> node 37 -> 
node 39”, which represents that the attacker 
launched a phishing attack towards the clients 
by using the compromised administrator’s 
session ID. 
The numbers following the last “:” in 
derivation nodes (oval nodes) and derived 
nodes (diamond nodes) are “p(e)” and “p(h)” 
calculated by Definition 2. For node 22, 
because the attacker could fully compromise 
workstation by using “CVE-2009-1918”, which 
enabled her to delete all browsing history, a 
data recovery tool had to be used to recover 
the deleted evidence. The overall weight for 
this evidence has been assigned as 0.8, (where 
“c” was “0.8”) because recovered data was not 
complete and considered as secondary 
evidence. “w”, “r”,”h” were assigned as 1 
respectively. 
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Figure 7 the Constructed Evidence Graph after Admissibility Check
7.   CONCLUSIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK  
We extended a prolog based reasoning 
framework to evaluate evidence’s admissibility 
so that we can construct an attack scenario 
substantiated by evidence that can rise to a 
legal standard of acceptability of evidence. 
Our preliminary experiment shows that we 
can successfully formalize the legal 
requirements to prolog rules that can support 
a given level of acceptability standard of 
evidence for attack scenario reconstruction. A 
final test of this claim requires more work in 
the following aspects. First, we need to 
formalize the operational security policy into 
this framework to ascertain if the accesses are 
legal. Second, we need to find a suitable way 
to use facts that are already known to be 
false, so that we can show the inadmissibility 
of evidence. Third, we plan to test the 
extended reasoning framework in a real attack 
scenario and work with cybercrime attorneys 
to ensure our reasoning can be folded into a 
formal charge.  
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APPENDIX 
1. Sample Reasoning Rules   
primitive(vulExists(_host, _vulID, _program)). 






/****         Interaction Rules                   *****/ 
 
interaction_rule( 
   (execCode(Host, Perm) :- 
 principalCompromised(Victim), 
 hasAccount(Victim, Host, Perm), 
 canAccessHost(Host)), 
   rule_desc('When a principal is compromised any 
machine he has an account on will also be 
compromised', 
   0.5)). 
 
interaction_rule( 
 (evidence(H,Perm) :- 
         execCode(H,Perm), 
         timeOrder(Zone,H,T1,T2), 
         hold(T1,T2)), 
         rule_desc('evidence with timestamp', 1.0)). 
 
… 
2. Input Facts in the Form of Predicates 
That Represent Evidence 




/* network topology and access control policy*/ 
attackerLocated(internet). 
hacl(internet, webServer, tcp, 80). 
hacl(webServer, dbServer,  tcp, 3660). 















/* configuration and attack information of webServer */ 
vulExists(webServer, 'CWE89', httpd). 
vulProperty('CWE89', remoteExploit, privEscalation). 
networkServiceInfo(webServer , httpd, tcp , 80 , 
apache). 
 
/* configuration and attack information of workStation1 
*/ 
vulExists(workStation1, 'CVE-2009-1918', httpd). 
vulProperty('CVE-2009-1918', remoteExploit, 
privEscalation). 
networkServiceInfo(workStation1 , httpd, tcp , 80 , 
apache). 
 
/* configuration and attack information of workStation2 
*/ 
vulExists(workStation2, 'CVE-2009-1918', httpd). 
vulProperty('CVE-2009-1918', remoteExploit, 
privEscalation). 
networkServiceInfo(workStation2 , httpd, tcp , 80 , 
apache). 
 
/* configuration and attack information of admin*/ 
vulExists(admin, 'XSS', httpd). 
vulProperty('XSS', remoteExploit, privEscalation). 
networkServiceInfo(admin , httpd, tcp , 80 , apache).
3.  The Notation of Each Node in Figure 2 
1 execCode(admin,apache) 
2 RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program) 
3 netAccess(admin,tcp,80) 
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10 RULE 5 (multi-hop access) 
11 hacl(webServer,dbServer,tcp,3660) 
12 execCode(webServer,apache) 
13 RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program) 
14 netAccess(webServer,tcp,80) 




19 RULE 5 (multi-hop access) 
20 hacl(workStation1,dbServer,tcp,3660) 
21 execCode(workStation1,apache) 
22 RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program) 
23 netAccess(workStation1,tcp,80) 




28 RULE 5 (multi-hop access) 
29 hacl(workStation2,dbServer,tcp,3660) 
30 execCode(workStation2,apache) 
31 RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program) 
32 netAccess(workStation2,tcp,80) 
33 RULE 6 (direct network access) 
34 hacl(internet,workStation2,tcp,80) 
35 networkServiceInfo(workStation2,httpd,tcp,80,apache) 
36 vulExists(workStation2,'CVE-2009-1918',httpd,remoteExploit,privEscalation) 
 
